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'You shall not be partial in judgment...."
-- Deuteronomy 1:17

I. INTRODUCTION
More than one thoughtful international business manager has been
haunted by the fear that foreign judges might not always respect Moses'
admonition to impartiality., Concern that the other side will have an unfair
advantage in its home court has often driven lawyers to include in
international contracts one of two forum selection devices:2 an arbitration
agreement entrusting the controversy to a private decision-maker or a courtselection clause granting adjudicatory power to courts at a designated

*Professor of Law, Boston University. Counsel, Ropes & Gray, Boston. Vice President, London
Court of International Arbitration. © William W. Park, 1998.
1. Conversely, some lawyers have occasionally been candid enough to admit their aspirations
toward a more favorable hearing before their client's own local courts. See, e.g., Societ6
Nationale Algerienne Pour La Recherche v. Distrigas Corp., 80 B.R. 606 n.2 (D. Mass 1987)
(statement of counsel). Mistrust of courts of an adversary's home jurisdiction can exist even
between peoples living in the same country. See discussion of federal jurisdiction, infra note 38.
2. In its fullest sense forum selection would seem to include all binding contractual choices of
the mechanism to decide a present or potential dispute, including any forum, whether public or
private. Although the term "forum selection clause" has often been used to designate a choice of
courts rather than arbitrators, this article, for the sake of clarity, will refer to party-selected
government dispute resolution as "court-selection."
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location.3 Both mechanisms can enhance political and procedural neutrality,
thereby facilitating business ventures when parties have a mutual mistrust of
each other's courts and a mutual interest in locking in a predictable dispute
resolution process at the time of contract signature. However, the
effectiveness of the two devices can differ radically due to quite disparate
statutory and treaty enforcement frameworks.
The growing disjunction between arbitration and court selection was
recently underscored in Richards v. Lloyd's of London,4 one of a spate of
cases 5 involving forum selection clauses6 calling for resolution in England of
claims brought by American investors in the well-known Lloyd's insurance
syndicates.7 Worried that such forum selection arrangements operated as de
facto waivers of rights under the federal securities laws, the Ninth Circuit
initially refused to enforce a set of clauses granting exclusive jurisdiction to
English courts,8 rejecting a line of decisions enforcing arbitration agreements
3. Court selection mechanisms are also called jurisdiction clauses or "prorogation agreements."
The term prorogation (from the French proroger)also covers a legislature's decision to adjourn.
Prorogation of both sorts involves the notion of extension: by contract parties' attempt to extend
a judge's jurisdiction, and by adjournment a parliament extends debates until a later time.
4. Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 107 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1997), reh'g, en banc, granted, 121 F.3d
565 (9th Cir. 1997), and op. withdrawn, substituted op., on reconsideration,en banc, 135 F.3d
1289 (9th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, (May 4, 1998). See generally Michael Novicoff, A
Funny Thing Happenedon the Way to the Forum, 20 LOS ANGELES LAW. 33 (1997).
5. For other decisions enforcing the forum selection provisions, see Haynsworth v. Corporation
of Lloyd's, 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997), rehg en banc denied, 129 F.3d 614 (5th Cir. 1997), and
cert. denied, 188 S.Ct. 1513 (1998); Allen v. Lloyd's, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 1996); Shell v. R.W.
Sturge Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995); Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993);
Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 945 (1993);
Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1021 (1992). At least one federal district court has criticised this trend. See Stamm v. Corp. of
Lloyd's, No. 96-5158 (SAS), 1997 WL 438773 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1997).
6. The 'Members Agent's Agreements" in Lloyd's syndicates called for both arbitration in
London and submission to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England. See, for example,
articles 15 and 18 of the agreements cited in footnotes 2 and 3 of Riley, 969 F.2d at 955.
Presumably, the potential conflict between the arbitration and court selection provisions could
be resolved by considering the jurisdictional submission which referred to the "curial"
jurisdiction of the English courts to supervise the arbitration. See Paul Smith Ltd. v. H & S Int'l
Holding Inc., 2 LLoYD'S REp. 127, 129-30 (1991), in which Justice Steyn (as he then was)
interpreted the reference to English courts (in a combined arbitration and jurisdiction clause) as
indicating the law governing the arbitration in matters such as interim relief, vacancies in the
arbitral tribunal, and removal of arbitrators for misconduct.
7. See The Lloyd's Mess: When Names Are Mud, ECONOMIST, July 27, 1991, at 17; The Liquidity
Gap at Lloyd's, ECONOMIST, May 16, 1991, at 101.
8. The Court referred to § 14 of the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1997)which provides
that "any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive
compliance with any provision of this title or the rules and regulations of the [Securities
Exchange Commission] shall be void" Independently of the other aspects of its reasoning, the
Court may have confused the matters of choice of law and choice of forum. While the two issues
certainly intersect, it is not self-evident why the Securities Act (the applicable law) should not
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in analogous situations.9 The court distinguished the arbitration cases on the
basis that they enforced a statutory mandate - the Federal Arbitration Actio
- rather than an "amorphous policy" favoring court selection." Although the
Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed its position and enforced the forum
clauses,2 the case illustrates the potential for expensive incongruity in the
treatment of two functionally equivalent types of forum selection.
To bridge this gap between public and private dispute resolution, the
United States might enact a statute similar to the Model International Court
Selection Act ("the Act")13 set forth in the Appendix.14 This article will take
be enforceable by an arbitrator (the party-selected adjudicator) in the same way as by a judge.
9. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (arbitration in Switzerland);
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (arbitration in
Japan).
10. 9 U.S.C. § 2 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
11. 'The Supreme Court [in the arbitration cases] chose to apply the Arbitration Act. It did not
weigh reasonableness or pit amorphous policy [benign toward court selection] against a
command of Congress [in the Securities Aces anti-waiver provisions]." Richards v. Lloyd's of
London, 107 F.3d 1422, 1427 (9th Cir. 1997). The opinion then continued in a rhetorical
question and answer format:
Is there a significant difference between a policy objection to enforcement and a
statutory obstacle to such enforcement? We believe there is ...A policy objection
[to the Securities Aces anti-waiver bars] represents judicial reasoning in the area
where the federal statutes, if they are to the contrary, must rule. A statutory
obstacle represents a legislative determination that is of at least equal weight
with another statute. Consequently, what was decided when the Arbitration Act
stood in the way of the [securities law] antiwaiver bars is not helpful when no
statute stands in the way of their enforcement.
Id.
12. Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed (May4,
1998).
13. The Draft International Court Selection Act is adapted from an earlier proposal in WILLIAM
W. PARK, INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION 191-92 (1995).

14. Careful observers of international litigation will note, however, that even the best of statutes
will not completely put arbitration and litigation on an equal footing. For the attitude of the
Ninth Circuit in Richards tells only a portion of the forum selection story. The United States'
failure to conclude any jurisdiction and judgments treaty also contributes to the poor
performance of court selection clauses when compared to arbitration agreements. See discussion
infra Part IIB(2). The statute would, however, at least constitute a starting point, albeit limited,
from which to enhance reliability in the judicial resolution of international disputes.
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the Model Act as a springboard to explore the divergent legal frameworks for
enforcing choice-of-court clauses and arbitration agreements. After a brief
summary of how the Act is intended to work, this article attempts to
anticipate some of the objections to the Act as well as potential jurisdictional
conflicts between the court allegedly designated by the contract and the court
that would otherwise hear the dispute.

II. TREATIES AND STATUTES
A. The Frameworkfor ArbitrationAgreements
The New York Arbitration Conventionn5 and the Federal Arbitration Act, 16
backed by a network of state and foreign arbitration acts,17 require courts in
the United States and abroad to enforce an arbitration clause and the
resulting award. The Convention directs courts to refer the parties to
arbitration if their contractual relationship is covered by a valid agreement to
arbitrate,8 and gives to an arbitral award covered by the Convention the
same force as a domestic award.9 The Federal Arbitration Act2o directs that
arbitration clauses "shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable"21 and that
courts shall stay proceedings as to any issue referable to arbitration.22
Although peculiarities of local contract law play a role in determining the
validity of an arbitration clause, American case law has made it clear that
states may not place special limits on the validity of an agreement to
arbitrate that would not apply to contracts in general.23

15. New York Convention On The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter New York
Convention].
16. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1997).
17. See generally, William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding
ProceduralIntegrity in InternationalArbitration,63 TUL. L. REV. 647 (1989).
18. See New York Convention, supra note 15, art. I.
19. See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1997). The Supreme Court in Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos, Inc. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265, 267-71 (1995) held that the FAA applies to the full extent of Congressional power
to regulate interstate and international commerce.

20. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1997).
21. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1997).

22. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1997).
23. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
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B. The Non-Frameworkfor Court Selection Clauses24
1. No Statutes
With the exception of New York state, no American jurisdiction has a
statute that treats court selection clauses as conclusive, and no federal
legislation does for choice-of-court clauses what the Federal Arbitration Act
does for arbitration agreements. 25 Although the United States Supreme Court
has manifested a benevolent attitude toward court selection clauses,26 its
decisions say only that court selection agreements will be respected if
"reasonable" by reference to a multiplicity of factors that vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. One lower court decision set forth nine factors
relevant to the reasonableness of a jurisdiction clause, emphasizing "the
totality of the circumstances measured in the interests of justice."27 A
jurisdiction clause thus constitutes only one factor to be weighed among
many others in balancing the relative convenience and fairness of different
litigation venues.
The situation is even more complex when one looks at state law.28 Several
24. See generally Anne E. Covey & Michael S. Morris, The Enforceability of Agreements
Providingfor Forum and Choice of Law Selection, 61 DENv. L.J. 837, 839 (1988); Francis M.
Dougherty, Validity of ContractualProvision Limiting Place or Court in Which Action May Be
Brought, 31 A.L.R. 4th 404 (1984); Michael Gruson, Forum Selection Clauses in International
and Interstate Commercial Agreement, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 133 (1982); Andreas Lowenfeld,
NationalizingInternationalLaw, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 121 (1997); Linda S. Mullenix,
Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: ConsensualAdjudicatory Procedurein Federal
Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291 (1988); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, More Bad Law:
Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction,27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 323 (1992);
Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatizationof Procedure,25 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 51 (1992).
25. New York State courts must honor a court selection clause in a transaction involving not
less than $1 million and subject to New York law. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (1) (1989) and
N.Y.C.P.L.R. 327(b). For a discussion of how the New York statute has been implemented in
international financial agreements, see LEE BUCHHEIT, HOW To NEGOTIATE EUROCURRENCY

LOAN AGREEMENTS 126-131 (1995).
26. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988); Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
27. D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., Inc., 570 F. Supp. 708, 712 (D.R.I. 1983). The factors
included: (1) the contract's substantive governing law; (2) the place of execution of the contract;
(3) the place of performance of the relevant transactions; (4) the type of remedies available in
the designated forum; (5) the public policy of the alternate forum; (6) the location of the parties,
witnesses and evidence; (7) the relative bargaining power of the parties; (8) fraud, undue
influence, or "other extenuating or exacerbating circumstances;" and (9) the conduct of the
parties. Id.
28. State law may apply not only in state courts, but also in federal courts where jurisdiction is
based on diversity of citizenship between the parties. Some federal courts see enforcement of a
jurisdiction clause as a matter of substantive law, requiring application of state norms in
diversity cases under the principle of Erie RR v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See, e.g.,
Alexander Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters L.P. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912 (11th Cir. 1989); In
re. Diaz Contracting, Inc. v. Nanco, 817 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1987); Farmland Indus. Inc. v.
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states still refuse to enforce court selection clauses, either in general29 or with
respect to particular contracts such as franchise agreements. 30 Even if a state
does accept the theoretical validity of jurisdiction clauses, courts in practice
may give a clause a restrictive interpretation that vitiates its effect. Some
court selection clauses have been construed as non-exclusive, therefore
inviting competing actions in different fora,3' or read to exclude actions based
on extra-contractual wrongs such as deceit and unfair business practices.32
Subject matter jurisdictional limits may also vitiate an otherwise valid
jurisdiction clause. Unless a case implicates a question of federal law, federal
court power generally is limited to cases arising on the basis of diversity of
citizenship. Thus, one foreigner may not normally sue another in federal
courts. State courts may likewise be restrained by statutory limits on their
33
power to hear cases.
Even a court possessing jurisdiction may, as a matter of discretion,
decline to hear a case on forum non conveniens grounds because of the
Frazier-Parrott Commodities Inc., 806 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1986); Bryant Electric Co. v.
Fredricksburg, 762 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1985). Other courts have assumed (often with little
discussion) that the matter is procedural, and that federal law applies.
29. As of this writing, court selection clauses are still generally unenforceable in Idaho, Iowa,
Maine, Montana, and Texas. See IDAHO CODE § 29-110 (1997); McCarty v. Herrick, 41 Idaho 529
(1925); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (1997); State ex rel. Polaris Indus. v. Dist. Ct., 695 P.2d
471 (Mont. 1985); Davenport Mach. & Foundry Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 314 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa
1982); Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 468 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); and Bartlett
v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 46 Me. 500 (1859). In at least two other states the situation is
somewhat ambiguous. In North Carolina, recent case law has limited the unenforceability of
court selection clauses to intra-state transactions. See Perkins v. CCH Computax, Inc., 423
S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1992). In Georgia, the Court of Appeals (the judicial level below the Georgia
Supreme Court) has disapproved previous Supreme Court decisions holding jurisdiction clauses
contrary to Georgia public policy. See Regency Mall Assocs. v. G.W.'s Restaurant, 444 S.E.2d
572 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Harry S. Peterson Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 209 Ga. App. 585
(Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
30. See, e.g., Kubis & Perszyk Assocs. v. Sun Microsystems, 680 A-2d 618 (N.J. 1996) (arising
under New Jersey Franchise Practices Act, and involving an ill-fated jurisdiction clause that
would have sent parties to California).
31. See Brooke Group v. JCH Syndicate 488, 663 N.E.2d 635 (N.Y. 1996) (service of suit clause
in insurance contract was permissive in nature, and did not preclude dismissal on forum non
conveniens grounds).
32. See Jacobson v. Mailboxes Etc., 646 N.E.2d 741 (Mass. 1995), in which the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court announced in dictum that it would abandon a century and a half of
precedent holding court selection clauses presumptively invalid. The trial judge, however, was
required to determine the "principal focus" of the plaintiffs claims (in order to avoid parallel
actions for contractual and non-contractual actions), with the consequence that to the date of
this writing the case has not been sent to the contractually selected forum.
33. See N. Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1314(b)(1)-(5); N.Y. BANIUNG LAW § 200(b) (limiting actions
between two foreign entities). As discussed infra, the effect of these limits was to some extent
mitigated by the enactment of N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402.
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location of witnesses and documents, or the drain on public resources.34 The
risk of judicial default is heightened in cross-border transactions, where
disputes often lack a judicially significant connection with the potential
forum.35 Although one judge might "export' a case pursuant to a court
selection clause in order to unclog the docket, judicial counterparts at the
"importing" court may not be eager to increase their workload by hearing a
dispute with little connection to the forum.

2. No Treaties
Court selection clauses also remain problematic due to the United States'
failure to conclude any treaty, or to enact any statute, providing for the
enforcement of court selection clauses or the resulting judgments when one
party resists the bargained-for venue. While the absence of any court
selection statute may be the result of legislative inadvertence, the American
inability to conclude any foreign judgments treaty is due principally to
apprehension among our allies and trading partners with respect to the
peculiarities of litigation in the United States: civil juries, punitive damages,
strict tort liability, and the perceived extraterritoriality of assertions of
jurisdiction.36
Courts in some jurisdictions do of course accord American judicial
decisions res judicata effect. Not all countries are so generous. In all events,
however, recognition of American judgments remains a matter of discretion
and "comity," deriving from internal law rather than international obligation.

34. Only New York has done away with forum non conveniens in court-selection cases, and only
within the confines of a statute covering a statutorily limited set of actions. The claim must be
governed by New York law and arise out of transactions of a million dollars or more. See N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 and N.Y.C.P.L.R. 327(b).

35. See Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank Ltd. of London, 184 N.E. 152, 160-61
(Mass. 1933) (holding that a claimant had no right to be heard in Massachusetts because the
economic impact of the dispute was localized abroad).
36. Since June 1994 the United States has participated in a Special Commission of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law considering an international convention on recognition
of judgments in civil and commercial matters. The Commission includes representatives from
more than thirty countries plus the European Union and several non-governmental
organizations such as the International Bar Association and UNIDROIT. See Hague Conference
on Private International Law, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Synthesis
on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters (Prel. Doc. 8, Nov. 1997), drafted by Catherine Kessedjian. See also Catherine
Kessedjian, Towards a Worldwide Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement, INT'L LITIG.
NEWS (I.B.A.), Aug. 1994, at 8; Andreas Lowenfeld, Forum Shopping, Antisuit Injunctions,
Negative Declarations,and Related Tools of InternationalLitigation,91 AM. J. INT'L L. 314, 322
(1997); Andreas Lowenfeld, Thoughts About a MultinationalJudgments Convention:A Reaction
to the von Mehren Report, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (1994); Arthur von Mehren,
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague
Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271 (1994).
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III. WHY COURT SELECTION MATTERS

A. The Special Needs of InternationalBusiness
Whether justified or not, concern over litigation bias against foreigners
will inevitably chill international transactions unless there exists a relatively
neutral alternative to the judicial system of the potential adversary. In the
international commercial arena, there exist no non-national commercial
courts of compulsory jurisdiction.3, Cross-border economic co-operation has
therefore come to rely on forum selection mechanisms of a contractual nature
to provide the neutrality and predictability which commercial actors in a
single-country context take for granted. Contracts do not enforce themselves
automatically, but need the intervention of flesh and blood adjudicators. Thus
the identity of who interprets the agreement may be more significant than
what the applicable law says about its construction.3s
In a domestic transaction, litigation will usually proceed in a relatively
homogeneous linguistic and procedural context, notwithstanding a court's
failure to give effect to the parties' choice of forum. Proceedings will go
forward in some variant of the English language according to a relatively
familiar set of federal or state civil procedure rules.
On the other hand, when an international venture goes awry, the
dramatically disagreeable consequences of a failed forum selection clause can
include unfamiliar procedures, a foreign language, and sometimes a judge in
a country without a tradition of judicial independence. The consequences to a
Boston merchant of having to litigate a dispute in Atlanta are hardly
comparable to the prospect of court proceedings in Algiers or Athens.
Without a relative measure of certainty in court selection, many
otherwise beneficial international commercial relationships either will be
concluded at higher costs, or will not be concluded at all. While some
transactions may be consummated even in a climate of adjudicatory
37. The experience of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) in commercial matters is limited
both by tradition and by jurisdictional constraints. For one commercial case that did reach the
I.C.J., see Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (U. S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20), reprinted in
28 I.L.M. 1109 (1989).
38. Even in commerce within the United States, the need for adjudicatory neutrality as between
residents of different states seems to have been recognized in the form of federal court diversity
jurisdiction, which operates to keep citizens of one state out of the potentially biased courts of
their adversary's home state. See, for example, the opinion in Bank of the United States v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87, 3 L.Ed. 38 (1809), where Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
"However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer justice as
impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is not less true, that the
constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such
indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national
tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of
different states."
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uncertainty, others will not.3 9 The enhancement of international economic
cooperation thus argues for a more hard-and-fast approach to the
enforcement of court selection clauses, notwithstanding the benefits of more
flexible principles applied in a domestic context.
The reality of litigation bias against foreigners may be less significant
than the perception that such prejudice exists. The consequences of imagined
prejudice often will be as disruptive as the real thing, in the sense that a
transaction may not go forward due to lack of confidence in the adjudicatory
mechanism.
The prevalence of this fear of judicial xenophobia was underscored by a
recent study of federal civil actions in the United States. The study found
that foreign litigants actually fare better than domestic parties. But the most
plausible explanation is distressing: foreigners' anxiety over the American
civil justice system causes them to continue to final judgment only when they
40
have particularly strong cases.
As mentioned earlier, arbitration law has already recognized the
international business manager's special need for reliability in dispute
resolution. For example, France, Switzerland and Belgium, as well as
countries that have adopted the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Arbitration Law, subject arbitral awards in
international disputes to less restrictive control mechanisms and a different
degree of judicial scrutiny than in domestic arbitration.4. In the United
States, case law considering cross-border dispute resolution has permitted
arbitration of what might otherwise have been non-arbitrable subject
42
matters.
Some lawyers see no need for such special treatment of international
arbitration.43 Indeed, certain countries have retreated from divergent legal
regimes for domestic and international arbitration,44 fearing that distinctions
39. On the effect of litigation risk aversion in international business, see William W. Park,
Neutrality, Predictabilityand Economic Co-operation,12 (No. 4) J. INVLARB. 99 (1995).
40. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1120, 1122 (1996). The study analyzed federal civil cases decided from 1986-94, using a
database of over 94,000 actions. Id.
41. See Chapters 28 to 34 in W. LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK AND JAN PAULSSON,
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION (2d ed. 1990).

42. See Sonatrach v. Distrigas, 80 Bankruptcy Rep. 606 (D. Mass. 1987) (claims in bankruptcy);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (antitrust claims);
and Scherk v. Alberto Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (securities law claims).
43. No less a scholar than Lord Mustill has written that he has "never understood why
international arbitration should be different in principle from any other kind of arbitration. .
See Michael Mustill, Cedric Barclay Memorial Lecture No. 1, 58 ARB. 159, 165 (Aug. 1992).
44. Under the now superseded 1979 English Arbitration Act, pre-dispute waiver of appeal on
points of law was not allowed between or among residents and/or citizens of the United
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based on nationality might conflict with international commitments.45
Yet there should no mystery about the need for a special status for
international arbitration. The legal framework for dispute resolution often
represents a compromise between two or more competing goals, each of which
would be extended but for the other. One such objective is judicial flexibility
in dealing with potentially abusive contractual choices that purport to modify
the way cases are heard by otherwise competent government tribunals. A
rival aim is to permit parties to international contracts to level the playing
field in the event of disputes so as to reduce the risk of "hometown justice" in
the other side's judicial system. One way to balance these contending policy
aspirations is to provide a separate regime for international transactions, as
set forth in the statute outlined in Part IV below.
B. Arbitration'sInadequacies,Real and Imagined
Even if one admits that adjudicatory neutrality bears a special premium
in international transactions, one might argue that parties to international
contracts can already get a relatively neutral forum through arbitration. Why
then complicate life by adding yet another law that restricts judicial
discretion?
The short answer is that commercial actors do not always believe they
can get what they want from arbitration. Rightly or wrongly, there is a fear
among many business managers that arbitrators tend to be undisciplined
wild cards, rendering "split the difference" awards that lack principle, and do
for commercial controversies what Solomon threatened to do in the proverbial
child custody dispute.46 Judges are seen as more predictable and more likely
to follow precedent.
The preference for courts may also be due to an information gap.
Corporate lawyers who draft dispute resolution clauses often ignore both the
existence of the New York Arbitration Convention and the vicissitudes of
foreign litigation, while the international litigators who inherit a deal gone
sour are not the ones who write the contracts.
Kingdom. The 1996 Arbitration Act contained similar provisions, which never entered into force
due to a perceived conflict with obligations within the European Union. See Arbitration Act, S.I.
1996, No. 3146 § 3 [hereinafter English Act] (providing that the Act would come into force
"except sections 85 to 87," which relate to domestic arbitration).
45. See Treaty on European Union, art. 6, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973, Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-11), as amended by Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719,
(providing that "[w]ithin the scope of application of this Treaty . . . any discrimination on
grounds of nationality shall be prohibited").
46. For Solomon's interim ruling ("Bring me a sword... [d]ivide the living child in two") and the
more felicitous final award ("Give the living child to the first woman... she is its mother"), see I
Kings 3:24-27.
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In addition, some lawyers distrust arbitration because it lacks full appeal
on the merits and formal rules of evidence. The less formalistic nature of
arbitration can work against some litigants in some contexts, just as in other
situations it can work in their favor. For many business conflicts, however,
informal proceedings will serve the parties' true interests better than a
legally flawless procedure involving costly appellate maneuvers.
Underlying these anecdotal critiques of arbitration, of course, is the
assumption that the client did not get all it wanted because the arbitrator
was no good, rather than due to a weak case or sloppy lawyering. But as
discussed below, there are more serious critiques of arbitration.
The interaction of federal and state arbitration law comes readily to mind
as the first candidate for statutory clarification. Although one result of the
American Civil War is that the Federal Arbitration Act should apply even in
Alabama,47 much recent case law has obscured the role of state law,4s
particularly on matters as to which federal law is silent. While the Federal
Arbitration Act will preempt application of more restrictive state arbitration
law, it is not always self-evident which state law rules will be considered
consistent with the goals and policies of the Federal Arbitration Act. For
example, no firm consensus exists yet on whether measures of interim relief
and pre-award attachment in arbitration are consistent with the New York
Arbitration Convention.49
A deeper well of potential trouble relates to the consolidation of related
claims, where problems inhere in the very architecture of arbitration, which
by its nature is a consensual process. Although the rules of some arbitral
47. See Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271 (1995) (rejecting the narrower
construction of "interstate commerce," which would have applied the Federal Arbitration Act
only to transactions in which the parties actually contemplated activities in more than one
state).
48. See Volt Information Sciences v. Stanford, 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (holding that arbitration in
California could be stayed under provisions of state law, reasoning that the parties had
incorporated California arbitration law into their agreement to arbitrate). However, in
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52 (1995), the Court upheld an arbitral
award for punitive damages notwithstanding that the relevant choice-of-law clause called for
application of New York law, which prohibits arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. See
also Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (striking down a Montana "notice statute"
requiring that arbitration clauses be in capital letters on the first page of the contract, as
inconsistent with "the goals and policies of the Federal Arbitration Ace').
49. Some courts reason that by bargaining for arbitration the parties have implicitly excluded
intervention by national courts until an award is rendered, while others view pre-award
attachment as a way to maximize the efficiency of the arbitral process consistent with the
parties' presumed intent. Compare McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. Coat S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032
(3rd Cir. 1974) (pre-award attachment denied) with Carolina Power & Light v. Uranex, 451 F.
Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal 1977) (pre-award attachment allowed). For a case in which pre-award
attachment permitted by state legislation did not withstand a challenge based on inconsistency
with the New York Convention, see Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 442 N.E.2d 1239
(N.Y. 1982).
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institutions provide for voluntary joinder of related arbitrations,0 this does
not obviate the need to obtain the consent of the party to be joined.1 For
better or for worse, the Federal Arbitration Act does not authorize forced
consolidation of different arbitration proceedings, even if they present similar
questions of law and fact.52 Therefore, a company may be whipsawed by
inconsistent results in connected contract disputes, unless arbitration takes
place in a state that does provide for joinder of related claimsp3 or all the
parties had the foresight to provide for consolidation in their various
arbitration agreements.
Even more problematic is a dispute involving both persons who have
signed an arbitration agreement and a person who has not. While courts
sometimes order arbitration with respect to non-signatories (usually on
theories of estoppel or fairness, when different controversies raise
interconnected issues),54 arbitrators themselves will not normally want to run
the risk of having their awards vacated when on their own initiative they
venture to pierce corporate veils or otherwise assert their power over nonsignatories.55

IV. A COURT SELECTION STATUTE
A. Thumbnail Sketch
The statute set forth as an appendix to this article was inspired in part by
Swiss conflict of laws principles56 and provisions of the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions.57 It is designed to give jurisdiction clauses much of the same
force now accorded arbitration agreements. The operative portion of the
50. See, e.g., art. 13.1(c) of the Arbitration Rules of the London Court of International
Arbitration.
51. See generally Sir Michael Mustill, MultipartiteArbitrations:An Agenda for Law-Makers, 7
ARB. INTL 393 (1991).

52. See Government of United Kingdom of Great Britain v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68 (2nd Cir.
1993) (denying consolidation of arbitrations with Boeing and Textron, Inc. relating to a contract
with the British Ministry of Defense to develop an electronic fuel system).
53 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 251, § 2A (1997), which calls for consolidation as provided in
the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 42 permits joinder of actions "involving a
common question of law or fact." Compare CA. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1281.3.
54. See, e.g., J. J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 320 (4th Cir.
1988).
55. See First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). See also Carte Blanche Pte.,
Ltd. v. Diner's Club Int'l, Inc., 2 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1993).
56. See Swiss Loi f~drale sur le droit internationalpriv6 art. 5 (Switz.).
57. See Brussels and Lugano Conventions, infra notes 64-65.
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statute takes a tripartite structure, dealing separately with (i) litigation
brought in disregard of the parties' agreement, (ii) the chosen court's duty to
hear a case, and (iii) recognition of the resulting judgment.
First, all courts in the United States would be required to stay actions
inconsistent with a valid choice-of-court clause. Inconsistent state law would
be preempted in much the same fashion that the Federal Arbitration Act
generally overrides conflicting state arbitration statutes.
Second, the Act would require federal courts to hear cases pursuant to
such clauses, as long as Constitutional jurisdictional requirements are met.58
Thus a court could not decline to hear a case covered by an exclusive
jurisdiction clause on the basis of forum non conveniens.
Finally, the statute would require recognition of judgments based on a
valid choice-of-court clause. This would be consonant with the Uniform
Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act,59 but would go further than its
enactment in those states that require reciprocity in the foreign jurisdiction.60
It would also be in line with the positions taken by the Restatement (Second)
Conflicts of Law6l and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law,62
which generally recognize foreign court decisions other than penal and tax
judgments.63
As explained more fully in the annotation below, the Act excludes from its
coverage contracts entirely between American residents and/or citizens. This
limitation in scope should make the Act more acceptable to those who would
otherwise oppose such a statute, while preserving its benefits for those who
need it most.
58. Federal court subject matter jurisdiction under Article M of the Constitution requires either
diversity of citizenship (a dispute between citizens of different states or between a U.S. citizen
and a foreigner) or a dispute raising a federal question. Federal courts have no power to hear
disputes entirely between foreigners unless the dispute implicates issues of federal law.
Resident alien individuals will be treated as citizens of the state of their domicile. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(a).
59. 13 U.L.A. 261 (1962). At present, 29 states as well as the District of Columbia and the Virgin
Islands have adopted the UFMJRA. Adopting states include Alaska, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and
Washington.
60. Currently Idaho, Georgia, Massachusetts, Ohio and Texas provide lack of reciprocity as a
ground for nonrecognition. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. Ch. 235, 1 23A, as interpreted in
Desjardins Ducharme v. Hunnewell, 585 N.E. 2d 321 (Mass. 1992).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98.
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

§ 481.

63. See Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Province of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F. 2d
1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 1979).
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In addition, the statute should operate in conjunction with bilateral
and/or multilateral treaties for the enforcement of judgments, to give to
American judicial decisions an international currency abroad. To be within
the realm of reality, however, such treaties might have to be limited in scope
to judicial decisions based on party consent in a written court-selection
clause. The widespread foreign fear of the American civil justice system with
its civil juries and punitive damages make it highly unlikely that very many
countries would accept a treaty that covered judgments not based on the
consent of the parties. Subject to this caveat, however, there is no reason that
an American court decision should not be treated as favorably as an arbitral
award rendered in the United States, provided it is subject to defenses
similar to those available under the New York Convention, Article V. The
parallel provisions of the Brusselles64 and Lugano65 Conventions would
provide an excellent model for such a multilateral treaty. But as Rudyard
Kipling might have written, "This is another story for another day," or at
least for another symposium.
B. Exegesis
1. Scope
a. InternationalDisputes
For what might be termed political reasons, the Act limits its scope to
international transactions. Many scholars mistrust binding forum selection,
whether through arbitration clauses or choice-of-court agreements. 66 These
thinkers thus resist limitations on judicial discretion to refuse enforcement of
64. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments, Sept. 27, 1968, as
amended, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1 [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
65. Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9 [hereinafter Lugano Convention].
66. See Thomas Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice:The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70
TUL. L. REV. 1945 (1996); Thomas Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea
for Statutory Reform 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. REsOL. 231 (1990); Thomas Carbonneau, Arbitration
as Contract:One More Word About FirstOptions o. Kaplan, 12 (No. 3) MEALY'S INT'L ARB. REPS.
21 (March 1997); Thomas Carbonneau, Beyond Trilogies: A New Bill of Rights and Law Practice
Through the Contract of Arbitration, 6 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1 (1995); THOMAS CARBONNEAU,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Ch. 7 (1997); Thomas Carbonneau, Le
Torunoi of Academic Commentary on Kaplan:A Reply to ProfessorRau, 12 (No. 4) MEALY'S INT'L
ARB. REPS. 35 (April 1997); Paul Carrington & Paul Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996
SUP. Or. REV. 331 (1997); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business.
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV.
33 (1997); Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration:Whither Consent?, 62
BROOK. L. REV. 1335 (1996); G. Richard Shell, FairPlay, Consent and SecuritiesArbitration:A
Comment on Spiedel, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1365 (1996); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrappingand
Slouching Toward Gomorrah. Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L.
REV. 1381 (1996). See also Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitrationand Voluntary Consent, 25
HOFSTRAL. REV. 83 (1996).

Spring 1998]

BRIDGING THE GAP IN FORUM SELECTION

such litigation control devices. Only mischief, they would argue, comes from
mandating recognition of mechanisms that lend themselves to abuse, either
through imposition of a forum predisposed toward the stronger contracting
party or by facilitating avoidance of mandatory public policies.
Rather than launch a broad assault on this paternalistic approach to
forum selection, the statute aims at the type of situation where forum
selection is most critical: a cross-border dispute that raises a substantial risk
of ending up in a court perceived as biased by one side or the other. The
model act thus proposes only a small step in the direction of enhancing forum
selection reliability.
A statute that distinguishes between domestic and international
litigation requires some criterion to distinguish one from the other. Two basic
models might be considered for defining what exactly constitutes an
international dispute: (i) a party-oriented test that looks to the residence of
the litigants, and (ii) a less mechanical approach that asks whether a
transaction implicates international commerce, regardless of who the parties
may be.
Looking to arbitration law for analogies, both paradigms have been
adopted. The party oriented test has found favor in Belgium67 and
Switzerland.68 The approach that looks to the nature of the transaction has
been enacted into the French arbitration statute. 69 The United States7o and
the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law take a hybrid approach.7'
67. See Belgian Codejudiciaire,art. 1717.
68. See Swiss Loi fdddrale sur le droit internationalpriv6, arts. 176 and 192.
69. See N.C.P.C., art. 1492 (Fr.) (referring to disputes that "implicate international commerce").
70. The United States excludes from the scope of the New York Convention contracts between
American citizens. However, an agreement between American citizens will be deemed to fall
under the Convention if the parties' relationship "involves property located abroad, envisages
performance or enforcement abroad or has some other reasonable relation with one or more
foreign states." 9 U.S.C. § 202. See Lander v. MAIMP Investments, 107 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1997), in
which the Convention was applied between an American manufacturer and an American
distributor in connection with their contract to distribute manufacturer's shampoo products in
Poland. Moreover, the United States applies the New York Arbitration Convention to nondomestic awards rendered in the United States if the award was made within the legal
framework of another country (i.e. foreign law) or involving parties domiciled or having their
principal place of business outside the United States. See also Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp.,
710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983).
71. The Model Law characterizes an arbitration as international if either (i)
the parties have
places of business in different states, (ii) the transaction has some connection to a state other
than the parties' place of business, or (iii) the parties have opted to treat their agreement as
international. See UNCITRAL Model Law art. 1(3), U.N. Sales NO. E.95.v.18 (1994) [hereinafter
UNICTRAL Model Law]. See also Fung Sang Trading Ltd. v. Kai Sun Sea Products Ltd., 2
WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 329, Dec. 1991, at 329 C.H.K. S. Ct., 29 Oct. 1991; Michael Pryles,
Hong Kong Supreme Court Issues FirstDecision on Model Law, 2 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 329
(1991).

TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 8:19

Focus on the parties' residence would seem the optimal way to determine
whether the special statutory r6gime should apply, for the simple reason that
when parties come from different places the statute can be expected to be
needed most.7 2 Even if elements of a contract are to be performed abroad, the
consequences of a failed forum selection clause will be less serious in disputes
between residents of the same country. Suit in such cases would likely be
filed at the domicile of one side or the other, which in neither case would be a
foreign country.
Those skeptical of the need to give court selection clauses dispositive
effect might suggest narrowing its scope even further to exclude transactions
between American citizens as well as residents.73 Not all Americans live in
the United States, however. In transactions between individual United States
citizens living in different parts of the world, it may make good sense to
subject potential disputes to American courts. It would be ironic if the model
statute denied to an American national a privilege accorded to an alien.

b. JudicialDiscretion
Only federal courts are required to hear cases submitted to them under
valid jurisdiction clauses.4 States would be left free to decide whether or not
their own courts could decline to hear cases on grounds of forum non
conveniens75 In this respect the Act differs from Swiss legislation on the same
topic, which seems to impose upon cantonal courts an obligation to accept
jurisdiction under court selection clauses.6
The Act expressly recognizes the restraints on forum selection imposed by
Article III of the United States Constitution, which puts certain cases beyond
the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts. Federal courts cannot be
required to hear a dispute exclusively between aliens or citizens of the same
state unless the dispute raises a question under the laws or treaties of the
United States. However, the Act leaves open for judicial interpretation
whether an international court selection statute could in itself serve as a

72. The recently enacted English Arbitration Act of 1996, however, abandoned separate
provisions for domestic contracts out of concern for non-discrimination obligations within the
European Union. See discussion of English Act, supra note 44.
73. An earlier version of this statute took exactly that position. See PARK, supranote 13, at 191.
74. Whether or not Congress could force state courts to decide cases is not free from doubt. It is
worth noting, however, that the Supreme Court has held that state courts may not decline
enforcement of federal statutory rights on local policy grounds. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386

(1947).
75. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW. § 5-1402 and N.Y. C.P.L.R. 327(b), discussed at supra note 25.
76. See Swiss Loi fgd6rale sur le droit internationalprivd art. 5 (Switz).

Spring 1998]

BRIDGING THE GAP IN FORUMSELECTION

source of federal question subject matter jurisdiction, much as the New York
ConventionT and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.78

c. Party Residence
In defining residence for individuals, the Act applies a bifurcated
approach drawn from fiscal models. First, as is the case in many income tax
treaties, an individual may be resident in the United States if present here at
least half the year (183 days). Second, an alien will be considered a resident if
he or she benefits from a permanent residence visa, similar to the so-called
"Green Card Test" used in determining tax residence under the Internal
Revenue Code.7s
With respect to juridical entities, the Act also takes tax definitions as its
inspiration. Corporations and partnerships will be considered American if
created or organized in the United States or under the law of the United
States or any state.80 In addition, an entity will be deemed to be an American
resident if its principal place of business is within the United States.
Branches of foreign corporations will be treated as residents.
d. Requirement of a Writing
The draft court selection Act covers only agreements in writing,81 thus

echoing the requirement for arbitration clauses in the New York Arbitration
Convention,82 the Federal Arbitration Act,83 and the UNCITRAL Model Law.84
Recourse to normally competent courts85 constitutes a right too important to

77. See Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corporation, 710 F.2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1983) (interpreting 9

U.S.C. §§ 203, 207).
78. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983) (applying the Foreign
Soverign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1392(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1982)).
79. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i).
80. See I.R.C. § 770(a)(4) and (30).
81. See Appendix B, Model International Court Selection Act § 1(a).
82. See New York Convention, supra note 15, art. II(1).
83. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
84. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 71, art. 7(2).
85. In this connection, the Swiss Constitution contains a wonderful phrase referring to one's
"natural judge." See Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, art. 58 ("Nul ne peut 6tre
distrait de son juge naturel." "Niemand darf seinem verfassungsmiissigen Richter entzogen.").
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relinquish by inadvertence or innuendo.s6
A written forum selection clause does not necessarily mean a signed
clause. For example, written arbitration clauses have been held to result from
an exchange of telexes or telegrams, or from a sales form or a transport
document that a shipper or a distributor has accepted by conduct but failed to
sign.87 In some cases the parties may orally agree to be bound by rules of a
8
trade association with written dispute resolution procedures.8

2. Consumers,Employees and Informed Consent
An irony of all forum selection devices, whether arbitration clauses or
choice-of-court agreements, is that the goals which justify their enforcement
in one context will often call them into question in another. In a commercial
contract concluded between sophisticated business managers advised by
competent counsel, a forum selection clause can promote fair and efficient
adjudication by permitting litigants from different countries to reduce the
risk of adjudicatory bias. In a consumer or employment contract, however,
the very same clause might deprive an unsophisticated individual of basic
procedural safeguards, imposing a forum that is less accessible, and perhaps
less sensitive to mandatory community norms such as non-discrimination
laws, than would be a court at the individual's domicile. Thus, the value of
freedom to choose a forum (like any liberty) must be measured against the
way it operates in practice.
To reduce potential abuse of court selection clauses, the Act excludes from
its scope consumer transactions and employment agreements, unless the
clause is concluded after the dispute arises (when the consumer or employee
will presumably be more aware of what is at stake), or unless the agreement
86. One dissenter from this principle has been Neil Kaplan, who during his time as High Court
judge in Hong Kong, decided many if not most of the early cases that arose there under the
UNCITRAL Model Law. Judge Kaplan (as he then was) has written that he finds it difficult to
see "why if one party is sent a contract which includes an arbitration clause and that party acts
on that contract and thus adopts it without qualification, that party should be allowed to wash
his hands of the arbitration clause but at the same time maintain an action for the price for the
goods delivered or conversely sue for breach." Neil Kaplan, Is the Need for Writing as Expressed
in the New York Convention and the Model Law Out of Step with Commercial Practice?, 12 ARB.
INT'L 27, 29 (1996).
87. See, for example, Swiss Tribunal fJddral decision in Compagnie de Navigation et Transports
SA v. MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co. SA, ATF 121 III 38 (16 January 1995) where the
arbitration clause was held void in an unsigned bill of lading. See also Huntington Int'l v.
Armstrong World Indus., 97 CV 699, E.D.N.Y., 22 October 1997 (holding that an arbitration
clause in manufacturer's Terms and Conditions of Sale held binding on plaintiff sales agent
although not signed by sales agent); Little v. Allstate Ins. Co., 705 A.2d 538 (Vt. 1997) (holding
that an arbitration clause contained in insurance contract held valid notwithstanding Vermont
statute making arbitration clauses in insurance contracts revocable).
88. For analogous dispositions in an arbitration statute see English Act, supra note 44, §5.
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grants the consumers a right to sue and be sued at their residence (thus
reducing the risk that the forum will be inherently unfair). This treatment of
consumer court selection contracts accords with the protection given under
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions to consumer contracts 89 and contracts
of employment.90
The Act also makes clear that courts have power to deny enforcement of
forum selection clauses in other areas when the clause is induced by fraud or
coercion. The requirement that a jurisdiction clause must not be "null, void or
inoperative" is reinforced by a specific exclusion from the scope of the Act for
contracts that are "procured by fraud, coercion or duress." While this overlap
of provisions intended to promote informed consent in forum selection clearly
suffers from the lack of elegance attaching to any redundancy, the special
substantive emphasis seems worth the stylistic cost.
Cases deciding analogous issues in arbitration illustrate the risks and
concerns related to informed consent that are likely to arise from a courtselection statute. While some judges have subjected consumer and
employment contracts to special scrutiny,91 the results have not always been
consistent. In the financial services area, for example, some courts have
refused to enforce arbitration clauses in consumer loan contracts, 92 while
other courts have upheld such agreements. 93 The heart of the matter seems to

89. See Brussels Convention, arts. 13-15, supra note 64, Lugano Convention, supra note 65.
90. See Brussels Convention, art. 17(5), supra note 64; Lugano Convention, art. 9, supra note 65.
The clause will be valid only if (a) post-dispute or (b) invoked by the employee to give jurisdiction
to courts other than those of the defendant's domicile or the place of employment.
91. In at least one case the judge ordered discovery with respect to the adequacy of the New
York Stock Exchange arbitration rules to resolve claimant's discrimination claims and the
circumstances surrounding claimant's agreement to arbitration (phrased as "waiver of her
rights to a federal forum"). See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 965 F.
Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1997). See also Margaret A. Jacobs, Brokerage Arbitration System in
Spotlight, WALL ST. J., October 17, 1997, at B-2 (discussing Judge Nancy Gerther's order of
April 23, 1997). The claimant alleged sexual harassment and discrimination.
92. See Geneva Bell v. Congress Mortgage, 24 Cal. App. 4th 1675 (Cal. App. 1st Dist., 1994),
ordered depublished 30 Cal. Rep. 2d 205 (1994). The court in Geneva Bell refused to compel
arbitration absent a "clear and informed" waiver of the right to a jury trial (homeowner claims
against mortgage lenders for fraudulent business practices). See also Patterson v. ITT
Consumer Fin. Corporation, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1659 (1993) (holding that an arbitration clause
used in documentation for relatively small loans was an unconscionable limit on the borrower's
1996) (no
opportunity to be heard); Lopez v. Plaza Fin. Co., 1996 WL 210073 (N.D. Ill.
enforcement of arbitration agreement in installment loan).
93. See Badie v. BNA, (Cal. Super. Court, San Francisco, No. 944916), decided 18 August 1994;
bench opinion discussed in 63 BNA's Banking Report 293 (29 August 1994) and 5 World Arb.
and Mediation Rep. (BNA) 231 (October 1994); Meyers v. Univest Home Loan, No. C-93-1783
MHP, 1993 WL 307747 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 1993) (consumer loan), McCarthy v. Providential
Corp., No. C-94-0627 FMS, 1994 WL 387852 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 1994) (senior citizen "reverse
mortgage").
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be whether such arbitration agreements are genuinely consensual.94
Cases struggling with arbitration in non-financial consumer transactions
have reached similarly inconsistent results, sometimes holding arbitration
clauses void for lack of informed consent, 95 while other times recognizing the
clause.9G At least two cases have enforced arbitration clauses packaged in
boxes of mail-order goods.97
Employment contracts, particularly when implicating charges of
discrimination, have supplied a fruitful ground to test the validity of
arbitration agreements.98 Likewise, malpractice claims against hospitals and
On "unconscionable" contract terms, see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of CONTRACTS §
208, and U.C.C. § 2-302. In one case, borrower's counsel remarked that arbitration "is like sex:
it's great if both parties consent, but can't be allowed if one party is forced into taking part."
ConsumerArbitration,4 World Arb. and Mediation Rep. (BNA) 192, 193 (1993) (quoting Patricia
Sturdevant, attorney for the plaintiffs in Badie v. Bank of America. Attorney Sturdevent applied
her comment generally to "ADR" (alternative dispute resolution), a broad category that includes
"arbitration" as well as other alternatives to judicial dispute resolution).
94.

95. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
812 (1995) and Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 113 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1997). Both
cases involved sexual harassment and discrimination claims by employees who signed "AU-4"
forms (Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration) on taking employment at
securities firms. Courts held that there was no knowing waiver of the right to litigate statutory
claims, notwithstanding arbitration clauses contained in the forms.
96. See Rojas v. TK Communs., 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996) (sexual harassment claim held
arbitrable); Stedor Enterprises Ltd. v. Armtex, 947 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1991) (enforcing an
arbitration agreement in fabric sale confirmation even though document unread and unsigned);
Golenia v. Bob Baker Toyota, 9i5 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (claim under Americans with
Disabilities Act held arbitrable); Johnson v. Hubbard Broadcasting, 940 F. Supp. 1447 (D. Minn.
1996) (arbitration agreement enforceable against former employee who brought race
discrimination claim); Wilson v. Kaiser Found. Hospitals, 141 Cal. App. 3d 891 (3d Dist. 1983)
(holding enforceable an arbitration clause in a medical agreement concerning a claim for
prenatal injuries by a child who became member of health plan at birth).
97. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (terms of arbitration clause
inside software box); Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.
47 (1997) (dealing with an arbitration clause in box containing computer oralered by mail and
not returned within thirty days; court stated that "a contract need not be read to be effective"
Id. at 1148, cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 295 (1997)).
98. See Pryner v.Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997) (discrimination claims related
to race and age arbitrable, but only if a worker agrees individually; union cannot through
collective bargaining agreement consent to arbitration of statutory rights claims); Cole v. Burns
Int'l. Sec. Services, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (racial discrimination claim subject to
arbitration, but employer may not require employee to pay arbitrators' fees). See also Prudential
v. Lai and Renteria v. Prudential, supra note 95. For background on arbitration of employment
claims, see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson, 500 U.S. 20 (1991), allowing arbitration of age
discrimination claims and Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), finding that an
employee may litigate discrimination claim notwithstanding arbitration clause in collective
bargaining agreement. Among the grounds on which the Supreme Court in Gilmer
distinguished Gardner-Denver was that the latter case involved a collective bargaining
agreement (rather than an individual employment contract) which did not authorize the union
to resolve statutory discrimination claims; in other words, consent to arbitration of the claim
was lacking.
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other health care organizations have fertilized legal development in this
area. 9 In all events, the voluntary nature of forum selection agreements
tends to be a highly fact-specific matter.100
Courts have also looked to see that the contractually designated arbitral
process is fundamentally fair. A self-administered dispute resolution system
allowing inordinate delay, 101 and an arbitral regime requiring a
disproportionately high filing fee,102 have been held unenforceable.
In Europe, statutory consumer protection regulations1O3 have been
applied to both pre-dispute and post-dispute arbitration agreements. 0 4 These
regulations invalidate unfair contract terms which, depending on the
circumstances, can include provisions that were not individually negotiated
and which, to the consumer's detriment, cause a "significant imbalance in the
parties' rights and obligations."105 Similar restrictions designed to protect
99. See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, (4th Dist. 1976) (arbitration
agreement not enforced); Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosp. 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976) (reversing
order denying arbitration and remanding for further proceedings); Colorado Permanente Med.
Group v. Evans, 926 P.2d 1218 (Colo. 1996) (HMO arbitration clause unenforceable for failure to
comply with statutory form requirement).
100. See generally Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract,86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986);
Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian MacNeil's Relational Theory of
Contract, 78 VA. L. REV. 1175 (1992) (discussing consent in contract). On consent to arbitration
agreements in a labor contract, see Stephen Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary
Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83 (1996).
101. See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997), rev'g 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d
621 (Cal. App. 1995). A malpractice claim against a health care provider in the Kaiser group was
subject to an arbitration clause. However, the ad hoc nature of the arbitration (which left
administration to the parties rather than an independent institution) tended to cause delay
favoring the defendant health care provider. The trial court had found fraud in the inducement,
allowing the deceased patient's heirs to rescind the agreement to arbitrate. The Court of
Appeals' decision reversing the trial court was itself reversed by the Supreme Court of
California, which remanded the case back to the trial court after finding that the habitual
delays in the process constituted evidence of fraud by Kaiser.
102. See Teleserve Systems Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 230 A-D. 2d 585 (4th Dep't 1997). MCI
had entered into an agreement with Teleserve to serve as agent in marketing its services. The
court found unconscionable an agreement that included a clause providing for arbitration under
the rules of the Washington, D.C. based 'Endispute" organization (in Washington, D.C.), which
required a filing fee based on the amount in dispute, which in the case at bar would have
amounted to $204,000 on claimant's request for $40,000,000 in compensatory damages.
103. See, e.g., Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 (on unfair terms
in consumer contracts).
104. For the extension of these regulations to arbitration in England, see English Act, ch. 23,
supra note 44.
105. U.K. Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations S.I. 1994, No. 3159, §§ 3, 4.
Consumers include individuals acting for purposes outside their business. See id. § 2. One
schedule to these Regulations contains an illustrative list of contract terms that may be
regarded as unfair, and therefore non-binding. This list includes an oddly worded reference to
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consumers have been written into jurisdiction and judgments treatiesloG and
some national statutes. 07 Moreover, some nations limit the use of both
arbitration agreements 08 and court selection clauses 09 in contracts not
concluded between "merchants," a term of art including persons contracting
in a commercial capacity.
The United States lags behind its European trading partners in statutes
that address the matter of arguably abusive arbitration clauses. This lack of
any comprehensive consumer or employee protection scheme for arbitration
in the United Statesilo has led to a lively dialogue among American scholars
concerning the fairness of voluntary arbitration agreements,"' particularly in
securities transactionsl2 and employment contracts." 3 Some scholars have
terms that require consumers to "take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal
provisions," Sched. 3.1(q). It is not immediately clear what is meant by this curious phraseology
which was lifted verbatim from the European Directive whose mandates were implemented by
the British rules.
106. See, e.g., Brussels Convention, supra note 64; Lugano Convention, supra note 65.
107. Swiss statute provides for the unenforceability of court selection clauses that "abusively"
deny the protection of Swiss law, and gives consumers a right (not waivable until after a dispute
has arisen) to sue a supplier either at the consumer's residence or the supplier's place of
business. See Loi fgdrale sur le droit internationalprivg, arts. 5(2) and 114.
108. See, e.g., FRENCH C. CIV. art. 2062 (Fr.) (generally prohibiting a pre-dispute arbitration
clause (clause compromissoire). Compare provisions allowing post-dispute agreements to
arbitrate (compromis) (C. Civ. art. 2060) (Fr.), as well as pre-dispute arbitration between
merchants (commer !ants)(C. COM. art. 631) (Fr.).
109. See FRENCH N.C.P.C. art. 48 (Fr.), art. 48, (prohibiting court selection clauses unless
concluded between commergants); German art. 38 ZPO, (invalidating forum selection clauses
(Gerichtsstandsklausel)except between merchants (Kaufleute)).
110. In both the House and the Senate, however, bills are currently being considered to curb
"involuntary application of arbitration" to employment discrimination claims. See Civil Rights
Procedures Protection Act of 1997, which would inter alia make the Federal Arbitration Act
inapplicable to any claim of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
age or disability. See S. DOC. NO. 63, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. DOC. No. 983, (1997).
111. See THOMAS CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

Ch.

7

(1997); Tom Carbonneau, Le Tornoi of Academic Commentary On Kaplan"A Reply to Professor
Rau, MEALY INT. ARB. REP., Vol. 12, No.4, April 1997, and MEALY'S INT'L ARBITRATION REPORTS

Vol. 12, No. 3, March 1997; Thomas Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice:The Demise of Due Process in
American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945 (1996); Thomas Carbonneau, Beyond Trilogies: A New Bill
of Rights and Law PracticeThrough the Contract of Arbitration, 6 AM. REV. INT. ARB. 1 (1995);
Thomas Carbonneau, Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court:A Plea for Statutory Reform, 5
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES. 231 (1990); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and
Jurisdiction,1996 SuP. CT. REV. 331 (1997).
112. See Richard E. Speidel, Securities Arbitration: A Decade After McMahon: Contract Theory
and Securities Arbitration: Whither Consent?, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1335 (1996); Richard Shell,
FairPlay, Consent and Securities Arbitration:A Comment on Speidel, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1365
(1996); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah. Arbitral
Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (1996).

Spring 1998]

BRIDGING THE GAP IN FORUM SELECTION

referred to proceedings under pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate as
"compelled arbitration,",4 implying lack of informed consent notwithstanding
contract signature. And at least one Supreme Court Justice has labeled
arbitration as "[d]espotic decision making."115 These thinkers thus resist
limitations on judicial discretion to refuse enforcement of such litigation
control devices, arguing that only mischief comes from recognizing a dispute
resolution mechanism that may impose a forum predisposed toward the
stronger contracting party, or facilitate avoidance of mandatory public
policies.
The real terms of the debate might best be framed as whether public
policy should allow pre-dispute consent to arbitration. The opportunity to
seek justice in otherwise competent courts, it might be argued, is more
fundamental than other contract terms, and thus should be non-waivable
until after a controversy has arisen, when parties better understand
specifically what is at stake. When a contract contains both an 8.75%
mortgage rate and a renunciation of the mortgagee's right to her day in court,
an argument can be made that the latter term should be unenforceable unless
accepted after the contours of a precise dispute appear on the near horizon.
Complicating matters in the United States is a Supreme Court decision
holding that state law may not impose on arbitration agreements
requirements inapplicable to other contracts.11 6 Consumer finance
agreements, particularly credit card contracts, often provide that they may be
altered upon written mailed notice to the consumer unless objection is made
within a specified period, such as thirty days. A state law requiring an
arbitration clause to be signed by both parties would arguably subject
arbitration agreements to greater restrictions than applicable to other
contracts, and thus run afoul of the Supreme Court ruling.117

113. See generallyWare, supra note 100.
114. See Schwartz, supra note 66.
115. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 657 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996), discussed supra notes 23 and 48,
where the Court held the Federal Arbitration Act to pre-empt a state notice requirement
stipulating that arbitration clauses had to be on the first page of a contract.
117. This is exactly what happened in Christine Williams v. Direct Cable and Beneficial Nat'l
Bank, a decision in which an Alabama Circuit Court granted a motion to compel arbitration
pursuant to a "mail out change" to a credit agreement on the theory that to refuse enforcement
to the modification would "place arbitration contracts in an inferior position to other contracts."
CIV.A.97-009, (Ala. Cir. Ct. 13 Aug. 1997).
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3. Subject Matter
The Act applies to any dispute of a "pecuniary nature." Thus non-property
questions such as child custody are beyond the scope of the Act. In this
respect the Act takes its inspiration from the innovative definition of
arbitrability in the Swiss conflict-of-laws code.118

4. Exclusivity or Non-exclusive Jurisdiction
Not all agreements granting decision-making authority to a designated
court impose jurisdictional exclusivity. Some jurisdiction clauses seek only to
avoid later arguments that a particular court has no power to hear the case.
In other words, the clause is intended to get the parties into at least one
acceptable jurisdiction, but not necessarily to foreclose other options. The
non-exclusivity of such forum selection clauses may be either unilateral or
bilateral. For example, financial institutions sometimes require borrowers to
bring litigation at the bank's domicile, while reserving the right to pursue
debtors in any otherwise competent court.
Under American law, whether a clause is exclusive (mandatory) or
nonexclusive (permissive) will depend on the intent of the parties as
determined by the language and context of the agreement.1 9 Some decisions
have stated that forum selection clauses will be enforced as exclusive only if
containing specific words to that effect,20 while others have taken the
opposite view.121 Wisdom, therefore, calls for parties seeking exclusivity to
provide that "all disputes shall be decided exclusively by" or "any claim shall
be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of' courts at the desired location.
Human nature being what it is, however, not all forum selection language
will be clear. The Act therefore creates a presumption that a jurisdiction
clause will be exclusive unless the contrary has been clearly stated. This
default rule assumes that the special need for predictability in international

118. See Swiss Loi fdrale sur le droit internationalprivg, art. 177.

119. See, e.g., Furry v. First NaVl Monetary Corp., 602 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Okla 1984); Central
Coal Co. v. Phibro Energy, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 595 (W.D. Va. 1988) (both holding the relevant
forum selection clauses to be exclusive). Cf. Heyco, Inc. v. Hayman, 636 F. Supp. 1545 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Patterson Enters, Ltd., 633 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); and First
Nat'l City Bank v. Nanz, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (all holding the relevant clauses
to be mere nonexclusive consents to jurisidction).
120. See, e.g., John Boutari & Sons, Wines & Spirits, S.A. v. Attiki Importers & Distributors, 22
F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1994), (quoting Docksider Ltd. v. Sea Tech., 875 F. 2d 762 (9th Cir. 1989)); Utah
Pizza Serv., Inc. v. Heigel, 784 F. Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1992).
121. See Central Coal Co. v. Phibro Energy Inc., 685 F. Supp. 595, 598 (W.D.Va. 1988) (finding
the clause exclusive the court said "[i]f the parties wished [the clause] to be permissive, they
should have drafted it so that that interpretation would be clearly evident").
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business argues for the exclusivity of a court selection clause.122 In other
words, staying out of the "wrong" court will be as important as giving power
to the "right" court. Under the Act, therefore, if a Swiss bank and its Boston
depositor agree to the jurisdiction of courts in Geneva, the Bostonian could
not normally bring suit in Massachusetts, absent clear language indicating
that the Swiss forum was just one of several alternative litigation venues.
When court selection clauses are governed by foreign law, an argument
might be made that they should be interpreted according to that applicable
law. Under this approach, a clause contained in a contract to be construed
under the English law would be exclusive or non-exclusive, valid or invalid,
depending on what a court in England would find. Such conflict-of-law claims
are likely to be complex, and might be best adjudicated on a case-by-case
basis.

5. Mandatory Norms
The Act echoes the "prospective waiver" dictum of the landmark decision
in Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,123 to the effect that a forum
selection clause will not be enforceable if it operates in tandem with a choiceof-law provision so as to defeat mandatory norms of the place of contract
performance. The genesis of this rule lies in the ingenuity of lawyers who
(understandably perhaps) wish to give their clients a better shot at avoiding
public policy limits on their behavior. For example, lenders might subject a
loan to the law of a country without a usury statute and also provide for
arbitration of disputes with the borrower under the auspices of an institution
known to appoint arbitrators untroubled by excessive interest charges.24
Whether or not such contract choices will prevail depends in large measure
on how arbitrators and judges balance party autonomy against the
application of laws implicating vital national interests.
Laws touching critical public policies have received considerable attention
in the context of antitrust, blockades, nationalization, currency controls,
122. See Swiss Loi fd6rale sur le droit internationalpriv6, art. 5 (providing that "[a]bsent a
stipulation to the contrary, the choice of forum is exclusive." (Sauf stipulation contraire,
lHlection de forum est exclusive./Geht aus der Vereinbarung nichts anderes hervor, so ist das
vereinbarte Gericht ausschliesslich zustindig)).
123. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
124. Differences in statutes of limitations or the validity of exculpatory clauses provide other
illustrations. In Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), the American party's
decision to ignore the contractually chosen forum in London commended itself (for the American
side) because the contract included language purporting to exculpate the Germans from liability
for damage to the rig. See id. at 8 and nn. 8-9 (noting that English courts would uphold the
exculpatory clause, thereby "deny[ing] Zapata relief to which it was 'entitled"). The Americans
assumed that the exculpatory language had more chance of being upheld by an English court
than an American one. In Zapata, the Supreme Court found the choice-of-law variation
irrelevant to international towing contracts. Id. at 15-16.
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bankruptcies, securities regulation, environmental protection and boycotts.
Sometimes described as "police laws" (lois de police25), or "mandatory norms,"
these laws supplant the otherwise applicable legal system in order to protect
social and economic policies of a country with an arguably greater interest in
the relevant conduct, usually the place of contract performance or other
economic activity.
At least one national statute126 and four international treaties deal
explicitly with mandatory norms. 127 The most important of these is the 1980
Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, which
provides for recognition of the mandatory rules of a legal system other than of
the normally applicable law.128
While judges can hardly ignore the public norms of the communities that
pay their salaries, the extent to which courts may or must apply mandatory
rules of a foreign forum is open to question. From the parties' perspective, the
recognition of a mandatory norm would arguably constitute an excess of
authority, contrary to the mission conferred by the parties. The power of the
chosen court, like that of an arbitrator, derives principally from the parties'
contract, which instructed the chosen tribunal to apply the contractually
designated substantive law.
On the other hand, the international currency of a judgment or award
requires that judges and arbitrators be sensitive to the public policies of legal
orders enforcing their decisions. Otherwise the judgments and awards risk
non-recognition.'
125. See, e.g., Pierre Mayer, Les lois de police 6trang6res, 1981 J. DUDROIT INTVL 277; See
generally BERNARD AUDIT, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt 92-113 (1991); Thomas G. Guedj, The
Theory of the Lois de Police, A Functional Trend in Continental Private InternationalLaw--A
ComparativeAnalysis With Modern American Theories, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 661 (1991).
126. See Swiss Loi fdddrale sur le droit internationalpriv6, art. 19.
127. See European Convention on Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, opened for
signature June 19, 1980, 10 I.L.M. 1492; Hague Convention of 14 March 1978 on Law
Applicable to Intermediary Agreements and Agency; Hague Convention on the Law Applicable
to Trusts and on their Recognition, done Oct. 20, 1984, U.N.T.S., reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1389
(1984); Hague Convention of 30 October 1985 on the Law Applicable to International
Agreements for the Sale of Goods 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, brought into force April 11, 1980.
128. Article 7 of the European Convention, supra note 127, provides:
When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be
given to mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the
situation has a close connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the
latter country, those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to
the contract. In considering whether to give effect to these mandatory rules,
regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of
their application or non-application.
129. In some cases the arbitrator's own conscience or respect for international public order could
impel departure from the parties' will. For example, an arbitrator might disregard a choice-oflaw clause that led to enforcement of a contract for the sale of illegal drugs or payment of a
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Courts in the United States have explicitly recognized the application of
mandatory norms in an arbitral context. One Supreme Court case even
interpreted the choice-of-law clause so as to infer the parties' assent to
application of a law other than the one specified in the contract. In Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc.,13o the Court deemed American
antitrust law to displace the parties' unambiguous selection of Swiss law.131

V. AGENDA FOR FUTURE DISCUSSION: ANALOGIES FROM ARBITRATION
Even the best of statutes will not solve all problems. If jurisdiction
clauses gain the same statutory currency as arbitration agreements, the
ingenuity of the bar can be expected to bring to court selection many of the
quarrels now known in actions to enforce arbitration agreements and awards.
The party resisting a judgment based on a contract's alleged jurisdictional
stipulation may claim that a foreign judge overstepped the bounds of the
powers conferred by the alleged court selection clause. In addition, if the
chosen court finds the principal contract illegal or invalid (for example, by
reason of fraud in the inducement), the argument might well be made that
the court's adjudicatory power, derived from the contract itself, was
retroactively destroyed.
No federal statute or treaty provides a jurisprudential foundation for
resolving such problems. However, case law and statutes do deal with
analogous questions in the context of an arbitration agreement. The following
two sections discuss some of these analogies from arbitration as they may be
helpful to scholars and judges grappling with similar issues in the context of
court selection.

A. JurisdictionalMatters
While the parties to a court selection clause expect the contractuallyselected court to be the sole adjudicator of the merits of the dispute, the same
cannot necessarily be said about the limits of the chosen court's own power.
Imagine, for example, that a claim is brought in a foreign court on the basis of
a jurisdiction clause which the defendant says is invalid. Should the party
resisting the foreign proceeding be able to go to court in the United States at
the outset of the proceedings to request an anti-suit injunction,132 or to bring a
bribe; alternatively, the arbitrator might decline jurisdiction to decide a dispute arising under
such a contract.
130. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
131. The court obtained from the claimant's counsel a stipulation to the effect that the Sherman
Act applied to the defendant's antitrust counterclaim. See id. at 637 n.19.
132. See, e.g., Andreas Lowenfeld, Forum Shopping,Antisuit Injunctions,Negative Declarations
and Related Tools of InternationalLitigation,91 AM. J. INT'L L. 314, 322 (1997).
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competing claim? Or must the defendant wait until a foreign judgment is
rendered, and then resist its enforcement? If a foreign judgment has already
been issued, what (if any) deference should a court being asked to enforce the
judgment show to the foreign judge's jurisdictional finding? What if the court
selection clause itself is not contested, but rather the foreign court is accused
of deciding matters not submitted to it? What if the foreign court ignored the
parties' mandate about applicable substantive law? As discussed below, such
questions in arbitration (with "arbitrator" substituted for "foreign court") are
usually analyzed according to a set of notions referred to as compgtencecomp6tence.

1. Compgtence-Compgtence
The concept referred to as comp6tence-competence (literally "jurisdiction
concerning jurisdiction") links together a constellation of disparate notions
about when arbitrators can rule on the limits of their own power. 33 In its
simplest formulation, compdtence-comp~tence means no more than that
arbitrators can look into their own jurisdiction without waiting for a court to
do so. In other words, there is no need to stop arbitral proceedings to refer a
jurisdictional issue to judges.134 However, under this brand of compgtencecomp6tence, the arbitrators' determination about their power would be subject
to judicial review at any time,135 whether after an award is rendered36 or
when a motion is made to stay court proceedings or to compel arbitration.37

133. See generally Carlos Alfaro & Flavia Guimarey, Who Should Determine Arbitrability?, 12
ARB. INT'L 415 (1996); William W. Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan:
What Sort of Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossedthe Atlantic?, 12 ARB. INT'L 137 (1996).
134. See, e.g., Christopher Brown Ltd. v. Genossenschaft Oesterreifchischer Waldbesitzer, 1
Q.B. 8. (1953); 1996 English Act § 30, supra note 44.
135. The same English Act that in § 30 provides for arbitrators to determine their own
jurisdiction as a preliminary matter also permits judicial challenge of any jurisdictional
determination. See English Act, supra note 44, § 67. It also provides for stay of litigation only if
the court is satisfied that the arbitration agreement is not "null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed." Id. § 9.
136. See discussion, infra note 142, of Vekoma v. Maran Coal Co., Swiss Tribunalfidgral, Civ.
Div. I, 17 Aug. 1995, reprinted in 14 ASA BULLETIN 673 (1996) (holding that courts in
Switzerland will examine the arbitrators' jurisdictional determinations de novo).
137. See, e.g., Three Valleys Municipal Water District v. E.F. Hutton, 925 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that the court should determine whether contracts were void because of
signatory's lack of power to bind principals). See also Compagnie de Navigation et Transports v.
Mediterranean Shipping Co., ATF 121 II 38 (16 January 1995), where the Swiss Tribunal
f~dral called for a full examination of the scope of the arbitration clause before stay of judicial
proceedings in favor of an arbitration outside of Switzerland, while admitting that in a domestic
arbitration the court might be limited to a "primafacie review" of the arbitration agreement's
validity.
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French law goes further and delays court review of arbitral jurisdiction
until after an award is rendered. If an arbitral tribunal has already begun to
hear a matter, courts must decline to hear the case. When an arbitral
tribunal has not yet been constituted, court litigation will go forward only if
the alleged arbitration agreement is clearly void (manifestement nulle).138
To some extent, what is at issue here is the timing of judicial scrutiny.
Going to court at the beginning of the proceedings can save expense for a
defendant improperly joined to the arbitration. On the other hand, judicial
resources may be conserved by delaying review until the end of the process,
when the parties may have settled.139
In the United States, the notion of an "agreement to arbitrate
arbitrability" has recently emerged to echo the doctrine of KompetenzKompetenz which was once applied in Germany.140 As discussed below, the
Supreme Court has suggested that in some situations what the Court called
"the arbitrability question itself' (i.e., the arbitrator's power to hear a matter)
may be bindingly submitted to arbitration, in which case the courts must
defer (give "considerable leeway") to arbitrators' jurisdictional decisions.141

2. A Tale of Three Cities
In the real world, the jurisdiction of an arbitrator or foreign judge is
rarely put to the test in extreme situations such as forged signatures or
contracts made with a gun at the head. Rather, questions and fact patterns
are usually subtle. Which of several claims are "related to" a contract? Should
a parent company be joined to a proceeding, either on an estoppel theory or as
the alter ego of the subsidiary? Was the claim brought within the requisite
contractual time period? Does a course of conduct or trade practice lead to an
implied arbitration clause?
Such jurisdictional matters have been examined in recent litigation in
Switzerland, the United States and Germany. As examined in this section,
138. See art. 1458 of the N.C.P.C. (Fr.).
139. Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law constitutes what some see as a compromise, by
providing for arbitral determination of jurisdiction in the form of an interim award, but giving
the disappointed party only thirty (30) days to challenge such an award. See UNCITRAL Model
Arbitration Law, supra note 71.
140. German case law traditi6nally used the term Kompetenz-Kompetenz to describe an arbitral

tribunal's power to rule on its own jurisdiction without subsequent judicial review. See PETER
SCHLOSSER, DAS RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATEN SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT

§ 556
(1989). Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law in Germany changed this situation. See Entwurf
eines Gesetze zur Neuordnung des Schiedsverfahrensrechts, July 1995, at 132; Klaus-Peter
Berger, Implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law in Germany, 13 INT'L ARB.REP. 38, 44-45
(Jan. 1998).
141. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 948 (1995).
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they provide a comparative perspective on increasingly frequent problems.
Common to all such situations is the principle that the parties' intent remains
the polar star for analysis of jurisdictional conditions to arbitration or court
selection.

a. Lausanne: Vekoma v. Maran Coal
In Vekoma v. Maran Coal Company,142 the Swiss Tribunal fgd6ral
invoked Article 190 (2) (b) of the Swiss Conflict of Laws Code (Loi fdral
sur
le droit internationalpriv6, hereinafter LDIP) to annul the award of an
International Chamber of Commerce arbitral tribunal that had declared itself
to have jurisdiction notwithstanding defendant's argument that the
arbitration had not been brought within the contractually stipulated time
limits. The background of this case involved a Dutch company that had
undertaken to ship coke to an American coal corporation pursuant to a
contract subject to Swiss law. Any dispute was to be resolved by ICC
arbitration in Geneva, subject to the condition that the claim be filed "within
thirty days after it was agreed that the difference or dispute cannot be
resolved by negotiation"
Controversy led to an arbitration claim filed in May 1992, resulting in an
award for the claimant. The defendant challenged the award on the basis
that the claim was not brought within the requisite contractual period of
thirty days from breakdown of negotiations. The jurisdiction of the
arbitrators depended on the timeliness of the claim, which in turn depended
on how one interpreted the communications between the parties: i.e., when
was there an "agreement to disagree," so as to trigger the thirty day period?
In the claimant's view, adopted by the arbitrators, settlement negotiations
had broken down only in April, and therefore the arbitration was timely.
The defendant took the position (with which the Tribunal f~dral agreed)
that failure to settle occurred in January, when a letter from claimants met
with silence.143 In finding for the defendant, the Tribunal frdral held it had
142. Transport en Handelsmaatschappij "Vekoma" B.V. v. Maran Coal Co., decision of Civil
Division I, 17 August 1995, reprintedin 14 (No. 4) ASA BULLETIN 673 (1996), (commentary by
Philippe Schweizer). ICC Arbitration No. 7565/BGD. See generally, Paul Friedland, The Swiss
Supreme Court Sets Aside an ICC Award, 13 (No. 1) J. INT'L ARB. 111 (1996) (suggesting that
the Tribunal f~dral improperly substituted its own view on the facts for that of the arbitral
tribunal); Pierre Karrer & Claudia K6lin-Nauer, Is There a FavorIurisdictionisArbitri?, 13 (No.
3) J. INT'L ARB. 31 (1996) (suggesting that the Tribunal f~ddral should have given "somewhat
more" deference to the arbitral tribunal's findings); Frangois Knoepfler & Philippe Schweizer,
Jurisprudence suisse en matire d'arbitrage international, 1996 REVUE SUISSE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL ET DROIT EUROP]EN 573 (describing the court's reasoning as "unnecessarily
subtle" -- inutilement subtil).

143. The Americans had sent a settlement offer in January 1992, asking for a reply no later
than January 17. When no response was forthcoming from the Dutch, the Americans then sent
a reminder notice three months later, to which the Dutch did reply (in the negative) on 13 April.
A claim was filed with the ICC on 11 May.
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power to review the jurisdictional decision of the arbitral tribunal de novo,
without the type of deference to the arbitral findings that would normally be
accorded a decision on the merits. The Tribunal fdd6ral then went on to find
that the arbitration clause had lapsed by the time the claim was filed several
months later.
The reasoning of the Tribunal f/dral is complicated by the fact that it
rests in large part on a distinction between fact and law.144 The court deemed
its review function to be more limited with respect to matters of fact than
law. 145 In this connection, the Tribunal f6d~ral said that the parties' might
have accepted that negotiations failed as a matter of either actual fact or
legal norm ("tatsdchlich oder normati").146 Finding that the claimant ought

to have concluded from the defendant's silence that its January settlement
offer had been refused, the court implied as a matter of law that negotiations
had failed.
While the Tribunal f~d~ral's view that its review function is limited to
issues of law is understandable with respect to lower (i.e., cantonal) court
decisions, it poses certain analytic paradoxes with respect to an arbitrator's
jurisdictional decisions. An excess of jurisdiction would seem to be an excess
of jurisdiction whether based on the wrong facts or the wrong law.147 Yet
Tribunal fidgral review will normally be exercised in the latter case but not
the former. De lege ferenda, it might be proposed that the right question with
respect to judicial review should be whether the arbitrators' mistake concerns
only the merits of the case (and is thus not reviewable), regardless of whether
the mistake relates to law or to fact.148
144. Karrer & K6lin-Nauer, supra note 142, state that "When the Swiss Federal Supreme Court
reviews a decision of an arbitral tribunal on its jurisdiction, it still fully reviews questions of
law. By contrast, findings of fact by an arbitral tribunal are reviewable only where they are
based on procedural errors which are themselves reviewable under Article 190, subsection 2,
letter d of the PIL Statute [relating to equal treatment and right to be heard] and possibly letter
e [public policy]."
145. See ASA BULLETIN, supra note 142, &3 at 676-77.
146. Id. & 3(c) at 678.
147. For example, an arbitral tribunal might take jurisdiction over a parent corporation on the
erroneous assumption that through its subsidiary the parent had entered into an arbitration
agreement. The error might result from an incorrect understanding of the law (legal grounds for
piercing the corporate veil) or the facts (capacity in which an individual signed the agreement),
or both.
148. See, e.g., PIERRE LALIVE, JEAN-FRANIS)i

POUDRET & CLAUDE REYMOND, LE DROIT DE

L'ARBITRAGE INTERNE ET INTERNATIONAL EN SUISSE 439 (1989), to the effect that 'De maniare

plus gdndrale, nous pensons qu"il convient de distinguer.. selon que l'examen [of the Tribunal
f~dral]portesur les motifs de recourspr6vus a l'article 190(2), auquel cos il est illimit6....." In
general, we believe one should distinguish.., cases in which [court] scrutiny relates to grounds
for challenge in Art. 190(2) [of the arbitration law, relating to arbitral jurisdiction], in which
instance review should be unlimited.").
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b. Boston: PaineWebberv. Elahi
Certain arbitration rules provide for disputes to be brought within a fixed
term after the controverted events.149 The complexity of the issues raised by
such arbitral preconditions are best illustrated by one of the cases that held
them to be for arbitrators rather than courts. In PaineWebber v. ElahiSO a
brokerage company moved to stay litigation with respect to a customer's
claim for losses sustained by reason of unsuitable and speculative
investments sold by the broker. The applicable arbitration rules of the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) as then in force required
an arbitration to be filed within six (6) years from the date of the event that
triggered the claim.
The brokerage firm argued that time limits were for the courts, while the
customer wanted time limits to be decided by the arbitrators. The reasons are
not difficult to understand. Brokers normally try to arbitrate rather than go
to court, in order to reduce or to avoid the generous punitive damages for
which American juries have become famous, the assumption being that
arbitrators are more "reasonable" that juries. However, brokerage firms
generally want time bars determined by courts. Presumably arbitrators will
be more likely than courts to find jurisdiction, since arbitrators get paid if
they hear a dispute.
No consensus yet exists on the matter of whether courts or arbitrators
should determine if time limits have been met. 51 Some decisions-including
Elahi-have held time bars to be a matter for arbitrators,152 while others have

149. See Rule 10304 (formerly Section 15) National Association of Securities Dealers Code of
Arbitration, providing that "no dispute, claim or controversy shall be eligible for submission to
arbitration under this Code where six (6) years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving
rise to the act or dispute, claim or controversy." See generally Sean Costello, Time Limits Under
Rule 10304 of the NASD Code of ArbitrationProcedure:Making ArbitratorsMore Like Judges or
Judges More Like Arbitrators, 52 BUS. LAW. 283 (1996); David Rivkin, Courts Differ on
Arbitrability of Time Limitations, ADR CURRENTS (A.B.A., Autumn 1996) 21. Under a recently
proposed change in the NASD rules the six year eligibility rule will be suspended for a three
year period. See REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS CRuder Report," so named for Task Force
Chairman David Ruder), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI) &85,735, Section V(B) (March 16, 1996).
150. 87 F.3d 589 (1st Cir. 1996).

151. The Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have considered time limits
contained in arbitration rules to constitute a jurisdictional prerequisite to arbitration, to be
determined by courts. The First, Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have held the matter
to be for the arbitrator. See Elahi, 87 F.3d at 596-99 (summarizing cases).
152. See, e.g., id. at 601 (citing language in Section 35 of the NASD Code of Arbitration
Procedure providing for arbitrators to "interpret and determine the applicability of all
provisions under this Code").

Spring 1998]

BRIDGING THE GAP IN FOR UM SELECTION

held interpretation of these limits to be for courts.

53

To understand how the First Circuit in Elahi arrived at the conclusion
that time limits are a question for arbitrators, one must start with its
sometimes confusing use of the expression "arbitrability issue."154 This term is
used to indicate a question that touches arbitral jurisdiction (rather than the
merits of a dispute), which the parties normally intended for the courts alone
to decide.
The Court began by presuming the parties' intent was not "to submit to
arbitration any issue other than the existence and scope of the agreement to
arbitrate." One might have thought, therefore that it would be for courts to
examine whether preconditions to arbitration had been fulfilled at the
moment one party wished to rely upon the arbitration clause, since nonfulfillment would normally taint the validity of the clause.
The Elahi court, however, engaged in a problematic characterization trick
that may well obfuscate sound analysis. The Court stated that time bars do
not relate to jurisdiction at all, thus removing the question from court
scrutiny.,55
By citing the "arbitrability dictuim" of the Supreme Court decision in First
Options,156 the First Circuit implied not only that arbitrators would have the
first word on the matter of time bars, but also the last. Under its analysis, a
question which is not an "arbitrability issue" would normally be a matter of
the merits in the dispute, on which arbitrators' decisions are final.
There are those who will see the Elahi decision as an exercise in
presuming one's own conclusion. If the contract intended to give the
arbitrator power to decide preconditions to arbitration, then why put
preconditions into the contract at all? Sound legal analysis requires
reconciliation of competing contract provisions, making sense of one term
without ignoring another. If a contract provided for "arbitration under the
rules of the American Arbitration Association," it is hardly conceivable that a
claimant who filed an action with the International Chamber of Commerce
rather than the American Arbitration Association could give AAA-appointed
arbitrators the power to bootstrap themselves into a job.
153. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch v. Cohen 62 F.2d 381 (11th Cir. 1995).
154. The term "arbitrability issue" is borrowed from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
155. "The presumption we adopt today [that time bars are for arbitrators] is about whether an
issue is one of 'arbitrability' [while the Supreme Court's presumption in First Options] was
about who decides issues that have been classified as 'arbitrability issues."' Elahi, 87 F.3d at
599. The court concluded by citing Section 35 of the NASD arbitration rules, allowing the
arbitrator to interpret the applicability of all provisions under the [NASD Arbitration] Code, as
an indication of an intent to arbitrate time limits.
156. See First Options, 514 U.S. 938.
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Courts in the United States have also struggled with analogous issues
related to statutes of limitations. Some decisions have held that statute-oflimitations questions are for judges when hearing a motion to compel
arbitration, but for arbitrators when hearing the underlying substantive
claim.57 This approach assumes that there are two separate time limits: one
applicable to the principal agreement (to buy, sell, license, lease or lend) and
one applicable to the agreement to arbitrate the dispute. The main agreement
is covered by the statute of limitations contained in its applicable law clause,
or in the law otherwise governing its interpretation. On the other hand, a
motion to compel arbitration implicates the relevant arbitration statute. 6 8 In
addition, some courts have held that the arbitrator's power to decide statute
of limitations matters is governed by the contractual choice-of-law clause,159
while others have excluded time limits from the scope of the applicable
substantive law.160

c. Berlin:Implied Arbitration Clauses?
In an intriguing case the highest court in Germany decided that it was
possible, at least in theory, that an arbitration clause might be implied in a
contract through trade usage. The Bundesgerichtsfhof decision of December 3,
199216, involved a sale of several thousand sheepskins arranged though an
exchange of telegrams. After cancelling the contract, the buyer sued for
reimbursement of the payments made. The seller requested arbitration,
according to the alleged practice in the hide and skin trade.62
The court found that trade usage alone could constitute evidence of a
mutual intent to arbitrate.63 The judicial reasoning is interesting. Rather
157. See National Iranian Oil v. Mapco Inel Inc., 983 F.2d 485, 491 (3d Cir. 1992); Avant
Petroleum, Inc. v. Pecten Arabian, Ltd., 696 F. Supp. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
158. See National Iranian Oil, 983 F.2d at 487-94. Since the FAA does not specify a statute of
limitations, the court reasoned that it must borrow the most analogous one from state law
under the conflict of laws principles of the state in which the court sits.
159. See Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 647 N.E.2d 1308 (N.Y. 1995) (noting
that N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7502 permits statute of limitations to be decided by courts).
160. See PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 2000 (2d Cir. 1996) (interpreting U.S.
Supreme Court Analysis in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52 (1995)).
161. BGHZ, Urt. V. 3.12.1992, III ZR 30/91. See 1993 DEUTScHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 465, with commentary by Klaus-Peter Berger.
162. The seller referred to the arbitration provisions in the standard form "International Hide &
Skin Contract No. 2," to which reference apparently had been made in one of its letters,
although never accepted by buyer.
163. The New York Convention requirement that an arbitration clause be in writing was not
fatal to the argument that an agreement to arbitrate could be implied from trade usage, since
the Convention by its own terms allows recognition of provisions of more favorable domestic
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than finding merely that an arbitration clause in one document could be
incorporated by reference to another (not a novel concept), the court seems to
have gone further and suggested that a commercial practice itself is enough
to create a duty to arbitrate. Since the Bundesgerichtshofdoes not itself deal
with issues of fact, the case was remanded to the lower court for a
determination of whether in the sheepskin trade there existed a commercial
practice of arbitration as alleged by seller.
B. Separability
Imagine that on the basis of a court selection clause a party-selected
judge has found the principal contract invalid. Will this necessarily invalidate
of the jurisdiction agreement itself? In connection with arbitration clauses,
this question has been dealt with through the principle "separability"
(sometimes called "autonomy"), by which the validity of an arbitration clause
is determined independently from the validity of the basic commercial
contract in which it is encapsulated. Established either by case law or by
statute in most national arbitration laws,164 the separability doctrine permits
arbitrators to invalidate the main contract (e.g., for illegality or fraud in the
inducement) without the risk that their decision will call into question the
validity of the arbitration clause from which they derive their power. In other
words, the separability doctrine gives arbitrators the tool with which to do
their job, by fully examining the parties' agreement. Moreover, separability
requires courts, when determining whether an arbitration should go forward
at all, to look only to the validity of the arbitration agreement.165
There would seem to be no reason why separability notions applied to
jurisdiction clauses should not also apply when courts are determining
whether to give res judicata effect to a foreign judgment based on the clause
in question. Conceptualizing the jurisdiction clause as separate from the
main agreement would also become relevant when a judge is asked to hear a
case in violation of an agreement between the parties entrusting the matter
to another court. Thus, the validity of the court selection clause would depend
only on the clause itself. For example, a memorandum of intent might refer
law. Article VII provides that the Convention "shall not... deprive any interested party of any
right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed
by the law ... of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon." See New York
Convention, supra note 15.
164. In the United States, see Prima Paint Corporationv. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
395 (1967); in France, see Arr~t Gosset, Cour de cassation, lere civ., 7 May 1963, discussed in
PHILIPPE FOUcHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, TRAITA DE L'ARBITRAGE
COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL (1996); in England, see English Act § 7, supra note 44; in
Switzerland, see LDIP art. 178(3), supra note 56. See also UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note
71, at art. 16(1).
165. See Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1991) (involving an
arbitration agreement in a "Memorandum of Intene').
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interpretation of the parties' relationship there under to a particular court.
This allocation of competence should be respected (assuming the court
selection clause was not otherwise defective) even if one side argued that the
memorandum itself was non-binding. In other words, it would be for the
party-selected court to look at the other sections of the memorandum to
determine whether it was or was not binding.
Separability, however, says nothing about the validity of the arbitration
clause itself, or by whom this validity is to be determined,166 a matter
examined above in the discussion of compdtence-comp6tence. The fact that an
arbitration clause might be valid notwithstanding infirmities in other terms
of the contract does not mean that the clause necessarily will be valid, or that
an arbitrator's erroneous decision on the clause's validity will escape judicial
scrutiny. Separability and comp6tence-competence intersect only in the sense
that arbitrators who rule on their own jurisdiction will look to the arbitration
clause alone, not to the entirety of the contract. The organization of some
arbitration statutes puts separability and comp tence-comp tence side by
side.167 Other statutes, however, maintain a clear-cut distinction between the
two doctrines.168
For example, an agreement between an American multinational and a
business consultant might provide for the latter's assistance in obtaining an
engineering contract in the Middle East. The Americans might resist paying
the consultant on two grounds: (i) the person who signed the agreement
allegedly on their behalf was not authorized to do so; and (ii) contract
payments were earmarked to bribe government officials.
Separability notions would permit the arbitrators to find the main
contract invalid (due to its illegal object of bribery), without thereby
destroying their power to render an award pursuant to the arbitration clause.
The separability doctrine would not, however, make the arbitration
agreement itself valid if the individual who signed the agreement had no
power to do so.
In turn, comp~tence-compdtenceprinciples would permit the arbitrators to
examine the power of the person who signed the contract (although perhaps
subject to subsequent court challenge). But under competence-competence
principles standing alone, without the sister doctrine of separability, the
166. Misunderstanding on the operation of separability, along with confusion about the meaning
of compdtence-compgtence, sometimes has led commentators to question the social value of these
doctrines, from concern that they may serve as roads to an arbitrator's improper arrogation of
power. See Ware, supra note 100.
167. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 71, art. 16(1).
168. See, e.g., English Act, supra note 44, which at § 7 says that an arbitration agreement "shall
not be regarded as invalid, non-existent or ineffective because [another agreement of which it
forms a part] is invalid, or did not come into existence," but gives the arbitral tribunal power to
rule on its own power (subject to judicial scrutiny) in § 30.
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arbitrators could not declare the main contract void for illegality without
thereby undermining their jurisdiction to do so.

VI. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the benevolent attitude toward court selection clauses
evidenced by the trend of modern judicial decisions, the United States lags
behind many of its trading partners in the enforceability of agreements to
resolve international commercial disputes in contractually designated courts.
Unlike Western Europe, where court selection clauses are enforced through
treaty and statute, no American jurisdiction gives dispositive effect to such
clauses.
The reliability of court selection clauses in the United States compares
unfavorably both to the treatment given such agreements in other nations
and to the implementation of arbitration agreements within the United
States itself. The Federal Arbitration Act and the New York Arbitration
Convention provide for the mandatory recognition of an agreement to
arbitrate and the resulting award. No analogous treaty or statute gives
similar force to jurisdiction clauses before American courts. Rather, a
discretionary approach to enforcement of court selection rests on forUm non
conveniens notions, with the consequence that arbitration clauses will often
outperform agreements to submit commercial controversies to party-chosen
courts.
The draft Model International Court Selection Act set forth in the
Appendix to this article aims to promote greater even-handedness in forum
selection. Replacing the patchwork of American rules on jurisdiction clauses,
the statute would apply only to international agreements. Federal courts
would be required to hear cases pursuant to court selection clauses as long as
the dispute fell within the subject matter limits of Article III of the
Constitution. In consumer transactions and contracts of employment the
statute would apply only when consumers or employees are given an option
to sue and to be sued at their domicile. Moreover, the Act would not apply to
court selection clauses that operate in tandem with choice of law clauses to
defeat fundamental public norms of the United States or the place of contract
performance.
Underlying the Court Selection Act is the assumption that commercial
actors are more likely to commit themselves to productive economic
cooperation when confident that controversies will be resolved in a fair forum.
While judicial discretion to disregard inconvenient court selection clauses
may have merit in domestic transactions, a more automatic approach to
enforcement of such clauses commends itself in international transactions,
given the special need to reduce the fear of bias in cross-border adjudication.
Over time, court selection will likely be plagued by jurisdictional
questions similar to those that now affect arbitration. In particular, one court

56
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may be asked to determine what deference (if any) it should give to
jurisdictional findings of another court on matters such as the validity and
scope of the court selection clause and the impact of trade usages in forum
selection. In all of these areas, judicial responses will be guided and enriched
by the extensive case law and commentary dealing with analogous issues
arising in commercial arbitration.

